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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
 
A t the end of Book IX of Plato’s Republic, Socrates seems to have answered the text’s central questions, having shown what the just life is and why it is better and happier than the unjust life.  Thus it is somewhat 
unclear why the dialogue should then turn to a discussion of the 
harmful effects of poetry in Book X.  This apparent discontinuity 
in the dialogue has led some scholars to dismiss Book X as a 
tacked-on addendum with little relevance to the main focus of 
the text.1  I, however, find no reason why we should be forced to 
accept such interpretations.  That Book X is difficult to interpret 
is certain; that we should thus reject it as gratuitous is hardly rea-
sonable.  As Eric Havelock writes, “[a]n author possessing 
Plato’s skill in composition is not likely to blunt the edge of what 
he is saying by allowing his thoughts to stray away from it at the 
end.”2  Thus the challenge for anyone writing on Book X is to ar-
ticulate just how Plato’s thoughts accord with the rest of the text 
in this book.  The goal of this paper is to do just that: to present 
an interpretation of Book X that incorporates it as a vital part of 
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the complete text, rather than viewing it as an unnecessary addi-
tion to a nine-book work. 
The typical way scholars go about situating Book X in the 
context of the rest of the Republic is to relate it back to passages 
from Books II and III, where Socrates first discusses the role and 
censorship of the poets.  The outcomes of such comparisons are 
diverse.  Some view Book X as completing ideas anticipated in 
Book III; others consider the two books to be saying essentially 
the same thing; still others see the two arguments as impossible 
to reconcile with one another.  I will not offer my opinion as to 
which of these assessments is correct, for my solution is to avoid 
this comparison entirely and rather to relate Book X to the central 
focus of the Republic, the defense of justice. 
To be sure, the argument against poetry in Book X does 
not add to the defense of justice in the strictest sense; it does not 
tell us more about what justice is (other than that the just life is 
one free of most poetry) or why the just life is better and happier.  
I will argue that what it does instead is to comment on the Repub-
lic’s defense of justice itself, showing us why we should believe 
that defense and how we should react to it.  To some, this inter-
pretation may still seem to present Book X as playing an auxil-
iary role with respect to the rest of the text.  This reasoning only 
holds, however, insofar as one takes Plato to be concerned in the 
Republic solely with presenting his account of the truth about jus-
tice and human virtue.  I do not support this reading.  The argu-
ments in Book X show that Plato’s ambitions extend beyond 
mere explication.  He is also concerned about how his account 
will be received, and Book X is his attempt to ensure that it is 
both accepted and followed.  Thus we cannot neglect its argu-
ments as irrelevant; indeed, we have reason to give them extra 
attention, as they are about how we are to respond to the text.  
That is what this paper aims to accomplish: to show how an ar-
gument about poetry is really an argument about us. 
 
II. THE METAPHYSICAL CHARGE AGAINST POETRY 
The first part of the argument against poetry, the metaphysical 
charge, challenges the popular conception of the poets by reveal-
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ing the true nature of popular poetry.  To this end, Socrates ar-
gues that such works of poetry are in fact imitations, and in par-
ticular, that they are imitative in their portrayal of human excel-
lence, or virtue.  This point is significant because popular opinion 
holds that works of poetry present the truth in this regard, 
whereas Socrates wants to show that their presentations fall far 
from the truth.  What we have yet to see, however, is how these 
qualities of popular poetry are a direct result of its being imita-
tive.  That is, what is it about being an imitation that makes the 
presentation of human excellence in these works not only so far 
from the truth but also convincing to the majority of people? 
To answer these questions we must get a better grasp of 
the concept of imitation as Socrates defines it.  His own explana-
tion of the word’s meaning relies on a three-tiered taxonomy of 
being: first, a thing as it truly is; second, something which is like 
the first thing, but is not it; and third, something which gives the 
appearance of the second thing.  For ease of reference, I will call 
the first kind of thing the reality, the second its likeness (eikōn3), 
and the third an appearance (phantasma/eidōlon4); imitations fall 
into this third group of appearances. 
This explanation, however, just displaces our problem.  
We can now say that popular poetry presents merely the appear-
ance of a likeness of genuine human excellence, but this does not 
show any better the connection between being an imitation, be-
ing far from the truth, and being convincing.  Comparison with 
another case of imitation will help elucidate this point at this 
stage.  Socrates himself draws an analogy with painting for just 
this purpose in Book X, but I want to avoid this comparison, as it 
fails to exemplify those imitative qualities we are most interested 
in.5  What we need to look at is a form of imitation that is clearly 
both far from the truth of what it imitates and convincing to its 
audience, and for this purpose I find good reason to look some-
where new, to a passage not often considered in discussions of 
Book X: the allegory of the cave.6 
First, consider Socrates’ taxonomy of being as applied to 
the different things in the allegory.  The first kind of being, or 
reality, corresponds to the world above the cave, where things 
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themselves exist in nature.  The likenesses of this reality are the 
artifacts carried in front of the fire—“statues of people and other 
animals, made out of stone, wood, and everything else.”7  These 
things are like the things above the cave but are decidedly not 
the same; they exist as representations of the things that truly 
are.  The appearances of these likenesses are, of course, their 
shadows, the images that go flittering by in front of the eyes of 
the prisoners.  Thus the shadows in the cave are imitations—in 
Book X’s sense of the word—of the actual things in the world 
above.8 
To understand what makes the shadows far from the 
truth, we must consider how they are produced.  We have seen 
that the shadows are classified as being appearances of statues, 
but we should not think of them as faithful reproductions of their 
likenesses; in fact, appearances by their very nature are distorted 
representations.  As Socrates notes, if one walks around a bed 
and views it from different angles, the bed will appear different 
each time without ever being different itself—it is always the 
same bed.9  Likewise, a statue will appear different as it is rotated 
and tilted, while always remaining one and the same statue.  
And if the statue were held in front of the light of a fire, one 
could easily produce many different shadows by simply turning 
and moving the statue around, as the shadow of a cylinder can 
look like a circle from one angle and a rectangle from another.  A 
shadow is precisely this kind of appearance, only capturing how 
its statue variously appears and not how it actually is.  It pre-
sents a two-dimensional silhouette of its statue, devoid of any 
color or texture; thus a shadow can hardly be said to be like its 
statue at all.  In this way, an appearance is hardly like its like-
ness, and like all forms of imitation, “touches only a small part of 
each thing.”10  Imitations capture things only as they appear, not 
as they are, and this is why imitations are so far from the truth. 
The next aspect to look at is what makes the shadows 
convincing to their audience, and for this purpose we must con-
sider how they are perceived by the prisoners inside the cave.  
That the prisoners find the shadows convincing is clear: they 
“believe that the truth is nothing other than the shadows,”11 to 
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the extent that they cannot even recognize reality for what it 
truly is.  Unless unchained, they never catch a glimpse of the 
world behind them; they wholeheartedly believe the world of 
shadows they see before them to be all there is.  Their belief is 
not due, however, to the shadows’ fidelity to reality; indeed, it 
cannot be, as the shadows are in fact far from the truth, as shown 
above.  Rather, their belief is caused by their own ignorance of 
the world outside the cave and of what reality truly is.  For their 
entire lives, the prisoners have seen nothing other than the shad-
ows; thus reality to them is nothing other than the shadows.  In 
their ignorance, they cannot see the shadows as we do.  They 
would never even think of them as being shadows, as they do not 
possess our distinction between shadows and reality.  From their 
point of view, the shadows are the reality, and it is of great im-
portance to keep their perspective in mind.  In this way, imita-
tions appear to be the truth to those who are ignorant, and this is 
why imitations are so convincing to their audience—not because 
they are intrinsically convincing, but because their audience has 
never encountered the truth. 
We are now ready to return to the case of popular poetry 
and see just how its imitations work.  To begin, consider the tax-
onomy of being as applied to the case of poetry and human ex-
cellence.  The first kind of thing, or the reality, would be the vir-
tue itself as its Form: Justice, Courage, Temperance, what have 
you.  This virtue’s likeness would be a person exhibiting excel-
lent behavior, an instance of the virtue but not the virtue itself.  
The third kind of thing would be the appearance of such a char-
acter in both senses of the word: a distorted portrayal of what 
excellent behavior is truly like that is nevertheless convincing to 
its audience.12  Socrates contends that popular poetry presents 
just such an appearance. 
The first criticism of popular poetry is that it is far from 
the truth of what it imitates.  In other words, popular works of 
poetry only capture a small part of excellent behavior, just as a 
shadow only captures the outline of its statue from one angle. 
Though both forms of imitation resemble their corresponding 
likenesses in a certain respect, they fail to resemble them in 
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countless others.  Just as a shadow distorts its statue’s color, tex-
ture, and three-dimensionality, poetic works distort the true na-
ture of excellent behavior (as it is presented in the Republic): ra-
tional thought and deliberation.13  The heroes of popular poetry, 
rather, are full of inner conflict, being pulled in various direc-
tions by their myriad desires.  They overreact and become emo-
tional over their tragic misfortunes.  They are “excitable and mul-
ticolored,”14 exaggerated and bombastic, exactly the sort of per-
sonalities we would call “dramatic” or “theatrical.”  These sorts 
of portrayals, fundamental to all the kinds of poetry that concern 
Socrates, do not at all capture what excellent behavior is truly 
like. 
Yet these sorts of appearances are no less convincing to 
the members of their audience, who are ignorant of the truth 
about excellent human behavior.  It is excitable and exaggerated 
heroes that we expect and demand from our poetry.  They are 
the types of characters we find most believable; they are the char-
acters which to us appear to be excellent.15  Socrates comments 
that: 
 
A rational and quiet character, which always re-
mains pretty well the same, is neither easy to imi-
tate nor easy to understand when imitated, espe-
cially not by a crowd consisting of all sorts of peo-
ple gathered together at a theater festival, for the 
experience being imitated is alien to them.16 
 
Socrates is here saying that the genuinely excellent character is 
out of place in the world of popular poetry.  His or her appear-
ance on stage would be odd and disorienting, but most of all un-
satisfying.  The piece would be looked upon as a poor and 
“unrealistic” work of art, when in fact it is closer to reality than 
anything normally presented by the poets.  A similar phenome-
non occurs inside the cave: if a prisoner were freed and com-
pelled to look at the statues behind him, “he’d believe that the 
things he saw earlier [the shadows] were truer than the ones he 
was seeing now.”17  Given the ignorance of the common people, 
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it is no surprise that they mistake the distorted portrayals of ex-
cellent behavior for the truth—they simply do not know any bet-
ter.  They believe in only what they are accustomed to seeing and 
thus are unreceptive to seeing anything different.  Popular opin-
ion only attributes so much wisdom to the poets because of the 
public’s own ignorance of what the truth is actually like. 
This is the push behind the metaphysical charge against 
poetry. In arguing that popular works of poetry are in fact imita-
tions, Socrates asserts the essential triviality of popular poetry, 
which, in the context of the discussion, is no trivial point.  He is 
arguing against the popular opinion that poets know all about 
human virtue and that popular works of poetry give us insight 
into the truth.  By revealing the actual triviality of popular po-
etry, Socrates destroys this very belief.  He shows that the things 
most people consider to be the truth are actually mere appear-
ances that are far removed from what the truth really is.  Or, in 
more familiar terms, the point is that up to now we have only 
been looking at shadows in the cave, and like the prisoners there, 
we are convinced of the truth of what we are seeing.  The discus-
sion of poetry in Book X is what Jonathan Lear would refer to as 
an “aha!-experience,” in which we say to ourselves, “So that’s 
what the allegory of the cave is really about!”18  It takes the alle-
gory of the cave and makes it real, showing us the hollowness in 
the common conception of human excellence. 
This point is essential to the argument of the Republic and 
begins to explain the placement of Book X in the text.  The de-
fense of justice presented in the first nine books is framed in con-
trast with the popular opinions of the time.  Thus after the true 
nature of justice has been explained and illustrated—that is, after 
Book IX—important questions still remain, questions any con-
temporary of Plato would have been likely to ask: Why should 
we doubt what we have always taken to be the truth? Why 
should we abandon what we, along with our fellow citizens, 
have believed since childhood in favor of the radical opinions of 
some philosopher?  The metaphysical charge, especially when 
read alongside the allegory of the cave, directly addresses these 
questions.  It shows that appearances can be deceiving, that what 
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we have always assumed to be the truth can in fact be far from it.  
By identifying popular works of poetry as imitations of human 
excellence, the argument shows that the truth of the matter need 
not look anything like the popular “wisdom” we glean from the 
poets.  Rather, the truth about human excellence can be some-
thing that seems foreign and even implausible—something, per-
haps, like the defense of justice that fills the pages before Book X.  
In this way, the metaphysical charge is indispensable to the over-
all argument of the text, showing why we should believe a phi-
losophical account that runs counter to everything we have hith-
erto believed—that is, why we should believe the argument of 
the Republic. 
 
III. THE ETHICAL CHARGE AGAINST POETRY 
Book X’s criticism does not end with the metaphysical charge.  In 
addition, it presents an ethical charge against popular poetry, 
showing that it, by its very nature, harms the souls of its listen-
ers.  In this way, the argument against poetry continues the dis-
cussion begun in Books VIII and IX of the various ways in which 
the soul can be corrupted.19  Popular poetry is shown in Book X 
to draw us away from virtuous behavior, instead encouraging us 
to act in shameful ways.  Moreover, the corrupting influence of 
poetry is not limited to those who are ignorant of what excellent 
behavior is truly like; as we will see, it is just as capable of harm-
ing those who know better. 
 First, however, we must understand what it is about 
popular poetry that makes it so ethically harmful to begin with.  
We know from the metaphysical charge that poetry is imitative 
in its portrayal of excellent human behavior.  To clarify just how 
imitative poetry works its ethical harm on its audience, Socrates 
considers the specific example of how it portrays human behav-
ior in matters of misfortune.  First he examines how we ourselves 
react to misfortune and recognizes that in such instances there 
are most often “two opposite inclinations in a person,”20 one that 
tells her to control her grief and another that tells her to give in to 
it.  The former is the voice of the rational part of her soul and on 
the side of “reason and law;”21 the latter is the voice of her non-
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rational part.  The urgings of the rational part point towards “the 
best way to deal with misfortune,”22 telling her to keep quiet and 
not get excited or overly emotional, so as to be able to deliberate 
over the best way to cope with the situation.  The non-rational 
part, on the other hand, exhorts her to lament over her sorrows, 
until she is “weeping and wailing” like a child.23 
As we saw above, the characters of imitative poetry are 
excited and exaggerated personalities that weep and wail over 
their misfortunes—that is, characters that act on the urgings of 
the non-rational part of the soul.  The real danger of popular po-
etry, however, comes from what happens when we watch these 
kinds of characters.  Socrates explains: 
 
When even the best of us hear Homer or some 
other tragedian imitating one of the heroes sor-
rowing and making a long lamenting speech or 
singing and beating his breast, you know that we 
enjoy it, give ourselves up to following it, sympa-
thize with the hero, take his sufferings seriously, 
and praise as a good poet the one who affects us 
most in this way.24 
 
What we appreciate and enjoy most about works of poetry is 
their ability to move us emotionally, to bring us into their dra-
matic world and make us feel their characters’ sorrows.  In other 
words, watching characters weep and wail on stage makes us 
weep and wail ourselves, provided the poet is a good one.  By 
presenting characters that act on the urgings of their non-rational 
part, imitative poetry makes us act on the urgings of our non-
rational part.  We weep, we wail, we become emotional.  Imitative 
poetry encourages us to disregard the bidding of our rational 
part and rather to act as our non-rational part wants us to act.  
Thus the imitative poet “arouses, nourishes, and strengthens this 
part of the soul and so destroys the rational one.”25  Imitative po-
etry rewards the lesser part and neglects the better part of us, 
and in this way it “puts a bad constitution in the soul of each in-
dividual.”26  This is why popular poetry is ethically harmful. 
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It may be thought, however, that the ethical danger of 
popular poetry can be removed if we know the truth about hu-
man excellence.  In other words, if one recognizes that the char-
acters in poetry are not acting in the truly best ways, one will 
have no reason to applaud, admire, or sympathize with them, 
and thus one will avoid any possible ethical harm.  Socrates even 
seems to suggest something of the sort at the beginning of Book 
X, when he says that imitative poetry is “likely to distort the 
thought of anyone who hears it, unless he has the knowledge of 
what it is really like, as a drug [pharmakon] to counteract it.”27  
However, it is a mistake to assume that this pharmakon is simply 
the account presented in the metaphysical charge, namely that 
poetry is imitative in its portrayal of human excellence.  This is 
certainly part of the pharmakon, but it is not all there is to it.  Soc-
rates says later that imitative poetry is “able to corrupt even de-
cent people,”28 which I take to mean that poetry is capable of 
harming even those who know better, those who know the truth 
about human excellence.  This means, of course, that there is an-
other part of poetry’s nature that even decent people fail to rec-
ognize and which, if not recognized, is capable of doing harm to 
one’s soul.  Thus we must consider how these people, who know 
that poetry does not present the truth, still manage to be cor-
rupted by poetry’s influence. 
To begin, Socrates notes that the sort of overemotional 
behavior seen in popular poetry is not at all what we would 
deem proper in our own lives.29  In our own behavior, the actions 
we value and praise are nothing like the actions we applaud in 
poetry.  When we ourselves experience misfortune, we know we 
should control our emotions, not give in to them.  In other 
words, in our own actions we recognize and strive towards 
genuine human excellence, while in our reactions to poetry we 
want to see the kinds of actions that are far from what is best and 
are in fact what is worst.  Socrates then raises the obvious ques-
tion: 
 
Then are we right to praise [imitative poetry]? Is it 
right to look at someone behaving in a way that 
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we would consider unworthy and shameful and 
to enjoy and praise it rather than being disgusted 
by it?30 
 
His answer to this question is an emphatic “no.” 
Socrates is here taking issue with an experience common 
to us all: enjoying things we know are not respectable.  When it is 
time for dessert, we enjoy most the cake that is supremely deca-
dent, even though we know it is not what is best for the body.  
The situation is the same in the case of imitative poetry: in our 
private misfortunes, we pride ourselves on our ability to control 
the non-rational part of our souls.  Yet this is “the very part that 
receives satisfaction and enjoyment from poets,”31 and we ad-
mire and enjoy the poetic works that satisfy us most in this way. 
From this example, it may seem that the temptation of 
poetry lies in its strong appeal to our non-rational desires, and 
without a doubt, this is part of the explanation: our emotional 
desires are naturally drawn towards the poet’s dramatic portray-
als.  But this is not the crux of the argument.  The point is that 
when we listen to poetry, our rational part is willing and even 
thinks it beneficial to indulge the desires of the non-rational part.  
Thus it is not that we can’t resist the allure of poetry—rather, it is 
that we don’t. 
Socrates contends that we act in this way out of igno-
rance.  Not having been “adequately educated by either reason 
or habit,”32 the rational part thinks that “there is no shame in-
volved for it in praising and pitying another man who, in spite of 
his claim to goodness, grieves excessively.”33  The rational part 
makes the mistake of relaxing its guard when watching someone 
else’s actions, whereas it would not relax itself in the case of its 
own.  This, however, is a fatal mistake, for whether one is re-
sponding to one’s own actions or to another’s, one is always re-
sponding with one and the same soul—one’s own.  The soul that 
we allow to take pleasure in the shameful actions of others is the 
same soul that will be in control in our own actions.  The non-
rational part, “if it is nourished and strengthened on the suffer-
ings of others, won’t easily be held in check when we ourselves 
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suffer.”34  By allowing the non-rational part to enjoy itself when 
listening to poetry, we are relinquishing the control the rational 
part has over our soul and our actions, which is an effect that 
will last even after the performance is finished. 
This is why imitative poetry can corrupt even those who 
know better than to act like the characters in tragedies or epics in 
their own lives.  Even though these people know that the behav-
ior of such characters is shameful, they do not recognize that the 
enjoyment of such behavior is also shameful; indeed, they deny 
this fact.  They view poetry as a harmless diversion, and a pleas-
urable one at that; this is what makes poetry so tempting to 
them.  They believe that poetry affords them the opportunity to 
gratify their non-rational desires without the risk of real harm, 
when in truth they are doing themselves the greatest harm—
corrupting the state of their very souls. 
Poetry may bring us into its fictional world of actors, but 
we as audience members are never pretending.  The way our 
souls react to poetry is as real and as genuine as actual experi-
ence.  If it is shameful to weep over one’s misfortunes in one’s 
own life, it is just as shameful and, moreover, harmful to weep 
over a character’s misfortunes in a work of poetry.  This is the 
fact that even decent people fail to recognize, and this is why 
imitative poetry can corrupt even them. Anyone who recognizes 
this final element of the ethical charge will not be willing to in-
dulge in the shameful enjoyment of poetry any more than he 
would be willing to behave in such shameful ways in his own 
life.  In other words, only now, at the end of the ethical charge, 
do we arrive at the aforementioned pharmakon—the knowledge 
of what imitative poetry in all its aspects is really like and the 
knowledge that ultimately prevents such poetry from doing us 
harm.35 
We can now see the full extent of the ethical charge 
against poetry.  First, we are shown that poetry, by drawing us 
into its dramatic world, strengthens the lesser part in us and 
thereby does harm to our souls.  Second, we are shown why even 
the best of us fail to avoid this danger by failing to recognize the 
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very real harm the enjoyment of poetry brings.  The conclusion is 
that no good can come from popular poetry, and thus the virtu-
ous life is one devoid of popular poetry. 
This point should not be lost on the reader of the Republic, 
for the ethical charge against poetry is just as important as the 
metaphysical charge to the overall argument of the text.  It shows 
us that knowing the truth about human excellence alone will not 
put us in a much better position.  In addition, we must actively 
live out this truth in our every action, and this message is a par-
ticularly relevant one at this stage in the dialogue.  The first nine 
books of the Republic present the reader with the truth about jus-
tice and human virtue; Book X tells the reader that just being 
aware of this truth is not enough.  That is, we should not think 
ourselves better for just having read the Republic.  What truly 
makes us better is what we do after we finish reading, namely, 
living our lives according to truth and virtue.  If we do not make 
such a change in our actions, the awareness we have of the truth 
gets us nowhere.  Thus the effect of the ethical charge is a galva-
nizing one.  It is Plato’s attempt to spur his readers into 
(virtuous) action and a warning against thinking oneself able to 
act shamefully without consequence.  It speaks to the need and 
urgency of virtuous behavior in all our actions, thus showing 




The importance and relevance of Book X can now be seen in all 
its manifestations.  Its arguments reflect back on the Republic’s 
central discussion of justice, showing why we should both accept 
and follow its account of virtue.  In this way, Book X, ostensibly 
an argument about poetry, is in fact an argument about us and 
how we are to react to the text.  Yet it may be suggested that 
Book X, strictly speaking, is not an argument for us but an argu-
ment for them, the original readers of the Republic.  Certainly, it 
cannot be denied that the criticisms in Book X were a result of the 
historical moment in which Plato was writing.  Poetry today is 
nothing like it was in that time, nor is there any one thing in our 
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own society with the ubiquity and influence of Ancient Greek 
poetry.  This does not mean, however, that the Republic is limited 
by its historical and cultural context.  More broadly speaking, 
Book X argues against the forces that prevent us from accepting 
and following the Republic’s account of justice and human virtue, 
and these forces are just as much present in our contemporary 
society.  The Republic’s ideas of what the just life is and why it is 
best still sound foreign to even our modern ears, and we are cer-
tainly a long way from abiding by such principles in our own 
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so.”  This distinction is also found in Greek: phainesthai with the 
participle yields the former sense (“that a thing manifestly is so 
and so”), phainesthai with the infinitive the latter (“that a thing 
appears to be so and so”).  Moss points out that Plato uses the 
infinitive construction exclusively in the relevant passages of 
Book X, suggesting that we should understand ‘appearance’ in 
its latter, “ostensible” sense.  (Cf. Moss, “What is Imitative Poetry 
and Why is it Bad?” 426, n. 19.  The lexical citations come from 
the Oxford American Dictionary and Liddell & Scott, respec-
tively.) 
13 cf. Plato, Republic, 604c-d. 
14 Ibid., 605a 
15 Here I follow closely the interpretation presented in Moss, 
“What is Imitative Poetry and Why is it Bad?” 432-434. 
16 Plato, Republic, 604e. 
17 Ibid., 515d. 
18 For more on “aha!-experiences”, see Lear, “Allegory and Myth 
in Plato’s Republic,” 37. 
19 This reading is also endorsed by Nehamas, who describes 
Book X as “a part of the long discussion of the perversions of the 
soul and of the city that begins with Book 8” (Nehamas, “Plato 
on Imitation and Poetry in Republic 10,” 53). 
20 Plato, Republic, 604b. 
21 Ibid., 604a. 
22 Ibid., 604d. 
23 Ibid., 604c. 
24 Ibid., 605c-d.  Note the use of the verb ‘sympathize’ in this pas-
sage.  The Greek verb is sumpaschein, or literally ‘to experience/
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suffer along with’.  According to the LSJ, this is a relatively rare 
word in the Greek corpus, and its earliest known usage is found 
in Plato’s Charmides.  There it is used in the sense of ‘to have the 
same thing happen to one', as is evident from the passage in 
which it appears: “…the sight of someone yawning opposite 
causes people to be affected [sumpaschousin] in the same 
way” (169c).  The only other instance of sumpaschein in Plato is in 
the passage from Book X quoted above, to which the LSJ (and 
also our translator) attributes the slightly different sense of ‘to 
have a fellow-feeling, sympathize, feel sympathy’.  However, 
given sumpaschein’s morphological roots and clear meaning in 
the Charmides, along with Plato’s very possible coinage of the 
word, ‘to sympathize’ seems like a mistranslation, likely influ-
enced by the related though not equivalent verb sumpathein, ‘to 
sympathize’.  Rather, we should read Plato here as saying that 
when we watch a poetic hero weep and wail over his misfor-
tunes, the same thing happens to us—that is, we also weep and 
wail over his misfortunes. 
25 Plato, Republic, 605b. 
26 Ibid., 605b. 
27 Ibid., 595b. 
28 Ibid., 605c, emphasis my own. 
29 cf. Ibid., 605d-e. 
30 Ibid., 605e. 
31 Ibid., 605a. 
32 Ibid., 606a. 
33 Ibid., 606b. 
34 Ibid., 606b. 
35 For evidence that the conclusions of the ethical charge are in-
deed the pharmakon mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, 
see Socrates’ comments at the end of the section: “We’ll repeat 
the argument we have just now put forward like an incantation 
so as to preserve ourselves from slipping back into that childish 
passion for poetry which the majority of people have” (608a). 
Both ‘pharmakon’ and ‘incantation’ have similar curative and 
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